Armed robbery / piracy
Definitions (Under BMP5)
The following definitions to term and categorise attacks and suspicious incidents that are reported from shipping inside the VRA may help. This ensures the consistent identification of patterns and trends.
Armed robbery The Code of Practice for the Investigation of the Crimes of Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships, highlights armed robbery against ships consists of:
- Any illegal act of violence or detention or any act of depredation, or threat thereof, other than an act of piracy, committed for private ends and directed against a ship or against persons or property on board such a ship, within a State’s internal waters, archipelagic waters and territorial sea.
- Any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act described above.
Attack An attack, as opposed to an approach, is where a ship has been subjected to an aggressive approach by an unidentified craft AND weapons have been discharged.
Hijack A hijack is where attackers have illegally boarded and taken control of a ship against the crew’s will. Hijackers will not always have the same objective (armed robbery, cargo theft or kidnapping).
Illegal boarding An illegal boarding is where attackers have boarded a ship but HAVE NOT taken control. Command remains with the Master. The most obvious example of this is the citadel scenario.
Piracy Piracy is defined in the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) (article 101). However, for the purposes of these BMP, it is important to provide clear, practical, working guidance to the industry to enable accurate and consistent assessment of suspicious activity and piracy attacks.
The following may assist in assessing what is a piracy attack. A piracy attack may include but is not limited to:
- The use of violence against the ship or its personnel, or any attempt to use violence.
- Attempt(s) to illegally board the ship where the Master suspects the persons are pirates.
- An actual boarding whether successful in gaining control of the ship or not.
- Attempts to overcome the SPM by the use of:1. Ladders.2. Grappling hooks.3. Weapons deliberately used against or at the ship.
Suspicious or aggressive approach Action taken by another craft may be deemed suspicious if any of the following occur (the list is not exhaustive):
- A definite course alteration towards a ship associated with a rapid increase in speed by the suspected craft, which cannot be accounted for by the prevailing conditions.
- Small craft sailing on the same course and speed for an uncommon period and distance, not in keeping with normal fishing or other circumstances prevailing in the area.
- Sudden changes in course towards the ship and aggressive behaviour.
Maritime piracy and maritime terrorism are known threats to global shipping, with piracy imposing substantial human and economic costs – particularly off the coast of Somalia – in recent years. Drug, weapon, and human trafficking also have an increasingly well-documented maritime dimension. Maritime piracy has tended to concentrate in just three regions in the last five years; the Horn of Africa (exclusively Somali pirates), the Gulf of Guinea (pirates from Nigeria), and the region in and around the Strait of Malacca (committed largely by Indonesian pirates). What may actually be the most significant threat for the maritime industry is the emerging “web of criminality” with pirates, terrorists, and “ordinary” criminals working opportunistically in an ad-hoc manner around criminal opportunities. All nations bear the economic costs of piracy. These costs stem from those associated with the direct protection of the vessel and its crew; to those associated with longer transit when pirate waters are avoided in favour of longer shipping routes.
Maritime piracy imposes both human costs and economic costs on maritime shipping. Human costs come in the form not only of seafarers being hijacked and held hostage, but injury during attacks and even death.
It is also important to note that the type of weapons used varies by location. Guns were used in eight incidents in Somalia, eighteen in Nigeria, and in six in the Malacca region. Knives (typically less lethal) remain the weapon of choice in Indonesia, Malacca and Malaysia, used in twenty-five of the attacks in this part of the world.
Examples of economic costs include transiting at increased speeds, the costs of military guards and equipment, insurance and labour costs, ransoms, and the costs of operating and maintaining the international task forces. There was considerable consternation when the cost figures were released in 2011 – up until then, most everyone who had thought at all about piracy believed the problem was restricted to a minor segment of the global shipping industry; few thought about calculating nearly all costs associated with maritime piracy or realized they could amount to more than $6.5 billion globally, with the estimated cost per ship per transit approximately $134,000.
The threat
As well as piracy, regional instability has introduced new security threats including the use of:
- Anti-ship missiles.
- Sea mines.
- Water-Borne Improvised Explosive Devices (WBIED).
PiracyPirates operate in Pirate Action Groups (PAG) who operate several different boat configurations, typically using small high speed (up to 25 knots) open boats or skiffs.
PAG boat configurations include:
- Skiffs only.
- Open whalers carrying significant quantities of fuel and often towing one or more attack skiffs.
- Motherships, which include merchant ships and fishing vessels but, more commonly, dhows.
Where motherships are used the crew are often held onboard as hostages. Motherships are used to carry pirates, stores, fuel and attack skiffs to enable pirates to operate over a much larger area and are significantly less affected by the weather. Attack skiffs are often towed behind motherships. Where the size of the mothership allows, skiffs may be carried onboard and camouflaged.
Pirates may use small arms fire and Rocket Propelled Grenades (RPGs) to intimidate Masters of ships to reduce speed or stop to allow them to board. The bridge and accommodation tend to be the main targets for these weapons.
Pirates use long lightweight ladders, knotted climbing ropes or long hooked poles to climb up the side of the ship. Once onboard they will make their way to the bridge to try to take control of the ship. When on the bridge they will demand the ship slows/stops to enable other pirates to board.
Attacks can take place at any time – day or night – however experience shows attacks at dawn and dusk are more likely. The intent of Somali pirates is to hijack the ship and hold the crew for ransom. The usual practice is to keep the crew onboard as negotiations progress, keeping both the crew and the ship together. Seafarers have occasionally been separated by nationality and taken ashore. It is in the interests of the pirates to keep their captives alive, although cases of intimidation and torture have occurred.
Anti-ship missilesAnti-ship missiles are long range, accurate and powerful weapons and have been used against military ships in the region. Their use against merchant ships associated with regional conflict cannot be discounted. Other ships may be hit if the missile controller targets the wrong ship or the missile homes in on an unintended target.
Sea minesSea mines have been used to deter and deny access to key ports in Yemen. These mines are usually tethered or anchored but may break free from moorings and drift into shipping
lanes. Transiting merchant ships are not a target and it is recommended ships use the MSTC when passing through the area.
Water-Borne Improvised Explosive DevicesWBIED attacks have been used against warships and merchant ships in the southern Red Sea/BAM/western area of the Gulf of Aden.
Incidents have highlighted attacks by different groups operating in the region:
- WBIED used in the regional conflict have been aimed at harming those associated with the conflict. These boats have been unmanned and operated remotely.
- WBIED used by extremists have been aimed at merchant ships. These boats have been manned.
An attack involving a WBIED is likely to involve one or more speed boats operated by a number of individuals approaching and firing both small arms and RPGs. Masters should recognise the intent of these attacks is to cause damage and not necessarily to board the ship. Mitigation measures to prevent the speed boat making contact with the ship’s hull are limited.
Threat assessment
The threat assessment must include all regional security threats.
As part of every ship risk assessment prior to transit through the HRA the latest military threat advice must be obtained from UKMTO www.ukmto.org and threat assessments from MSCHOA www.mschoa.org.
A threat is formed of capability, intent and opportunity.
Capability means attackers have the physical means to conduct an attack. Intent is demonstrated by continued attacks. Opportunity is what is mitigated by the company, ship and crew through application of the measures described in this guidance. In addition to the information provided in this guidance, supplementary information about the characteristics of the threat, specific or new tactics, and regional background factors may be sought from regional reporting centres.
If one side of the triangle is removed, then risk is minimised. The company/Master cannot influence either capability or intent, therefore BMP measures focus on minimising the opportunity.